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The involvement of facial mimicry in different aspects of human emotional processing is widely debated. However, little is known about
relationships between voluntary activation of facial musculature and conscious recognition of facial expressions. To address this issue,
we assessed severely motor-disabled patients with complete paralysis of voluntary facial movements due to lesions of the ventral pons
[locked-in syndrome (LIS)]. Patients were required to recognize others’ facial expressions and to rate their own emotional responses to
presentationof affective scenes.LISpatientswere selectively impaired in recognitionofnegative facial expressions, thusdemonstrating that the
voluntary activation ofmimicry represents a high-level simulationmechanism crucially involved in explicit attribution of emotions.
Introduction
Darwin (1872) claimed that emotional experience is intensified
by its behavioral expression and inhibited by the suppression
thereof. Several modern lines of evidence support this claim. For
instance, subjects required to produce facial muscle contractions
covertly facilitating or inhibiting smile (e.g., to hold a pen be-
tween teeth or between lips) report subjective experiences or
judge external stimuli consistently with their imposed facial
mimicry (for review, seeNiedenthal, 2007;Oberman et al., 2007).
Moreover, it has been shown that observation of happy and angry
faces determines a correspondingmimic response in the observer
(Dimberg et al., 2000). Such facial response is spontaneous (i.e.,
without external prompting or a goal to mimic) (Dimberg and
Lundquist, 1988), unconscious (i.e., it occurs evenwhen faces are
presented subliminally), and rapid (i.e., it emerges within one
second after face presentation) (Dimberg et al., 2000). Spontane-
ousmimicry thus differs fromvoluntary facial expressions, which
are effortful and slow (Dimberg et al., 2002), are affected by con-
textual demands (Ekman, 1992), and involve different neuro-
functional mechanisms (Ekman, 1992; Tassinary and Cacioppo,
2000; Morecraft et al., 2004).
The influence of facialmimicry on different aspects of emotional
experience is in keeping with theories positing that perception of
others’ emotions requires reactivation of the sensorimotor sys-
tem (embodied cognition) (Gallese, 2003; Goldman and Sripada,
2005; Adolphs, 2006; Niedenthal, 2007). For instance, spontane-
ous facial mimicry may facilitate immediate empathy via a pro-
cess of internal simulation of the observed emotion (Niedenthal,
2007). However, autistic individuals, whose spontaneous mim-
icry is impaired, perform tasks requiring recognition of facial
expressions as well as normal controls (Oberman et al., 2009).
These findings could suggest that voluntary facial motility,
spared in autistic individuals, may contribute to explicit rec-
ognition of emotional facial expressions. This hypothesis
would fit with theoretical frames according to which under-
standing of others’ emotional states calls for both conscious
and unconscious cognitive processes (Keysers and Gazzola,
2006; Goldman, 2009).
To directly verify whether voluntary mimicry is involved in
explicit recognition of emotional facial expressions, we studied
patients affected by severe impairments of voluntary motility
[i.e., locked-in syndrome (LIS)]. LIS patients show quadriplegia,
mutism, and bilateral facial palsy with preservation of vertical
gaze and upper eyelid movements; consciousness and cognitive
abilities are spared (Schnakers et al., 2008). LIS patients are able
to interact with the environment solely through eye-coded com-
munication; despite this extreme degree of motor disability, LIS
patients appear emotionally adapted to their severe physical con-
ditions (Cappa et al., 1985; Lule´ et al., 2009). The causal ventral
pontine lesion in LIS patients usually spares neural structures
involved in producing spontaneous facial expressions (Hopf et
al., 1992; To¨pper et al., 1995). Because of the dissociation between
voluntary (abolished) and involuntary (spared) facial mimicry,
our hypothesis predicts that LIS patients are impaired in con-
sciously recognizing emotional facial expressions, despite pre-
served emotional responses to evocative scenes not involving
faces.
Materials andMethods
Participants. Seven LIS inpatients (mean age  49 years; SD  13.7;
range, 26–66; mean education 11 years; SD 3.8; range, 5–17) of the
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were included in the study; all patients were tested several months after
onset (Table 1) andwere in stabilized clinical conditions. Consistent with
the diagnosis of pure LIS (Bauer et al., 1979), all patients showed a com-
plete loss of any voluntary verbal or motor output with the exception of
vertical eye movements and blinking. In particular, LIS patients could
not produce voluntary facial movements; this clinical impression was
endorsed by electromyography recordings obtained from facial muscles
in all patients, according to standard procedures. At rest, all patients
showed diffuse fibrillation potentials compatible with a lesion of the
second motoneuron; when patients were asked to voluntarily perform
facial movements, no appreciable recruitment of motor unit action po-
tentials could be recorded, consistent with a damage of the descending
motor pathways (Fig. 1). As all enrolled patients did not present eye gaze
deviation or involuntary ocular movements, they could communicate
via an eye-response code reliably (upward eye movements meaning af-
firmative responses and downward movements meaning negative re-
sponses). By these means, we could ascertain that they showed preserved
vision on confrontation procedures, a finding further confirmed by nor-
mal visual-evoked potentials. Disorders of visual cognition, potentially
interfering with the experimental study, were excluded by patients’ nor-
mal performance on tests for visuospatial intelligence (Raven’s colored
progressive matrices; Caltagirone et al., 1995) and face perception (Ben-
ton facial recognition test; Benton et al., 1992) (Table 1).
Although LIS patients could not produce voluntary facial movements
upon verbal request or as imitation, environmental stimuli could some-
times trigger laughter or crying responses in tunewith the context in all of
them. These spontaneous emotional expressions were not part of the
so-called pathological laughter and crying episodes, in which stereotyped
and uncontrollable facial mimicry is precipitated by nonspecific stimuli
and does not correlate with patients’ feeling (Sacco et al., 2008). At the
time of testing, no patient showed signs of anxiety or depression, assessed
on clinical grounds and by means of an adapted version of the Hospital
Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) (Zigmond and Snaith, 1983), a
questionnaire specifically designed to assess psychological distress in pa-
tients with severe disabilities. The HADS provides separate scores for
anxiety and depression ranging from 0 to 21, with scores of 7 or less
considered as non-cases, scores of 8–10 indicating possible levels of dis-
tress, and scores of 11 or above corresponding to clinical levels of distress
(Zigmond and Snaith, 1983). In the present study, both HADS anxiety
and depression scores were well within the normal range (mean HADS
anxiety score  5.57; SD  1.13; mean HADS depression score  6,
SD 1.19). Accordingly, no patient was under psychopharmacological
treatment.
Whole-brainmagnetic resonance (MR) demonstrated that all enrolled
patients were affected by a selective lesion at the brainstem. The pontine
lesion responsible for LIS was ischemic in six cases, due to posttraumatic
(patient 1) or spontaneous (patients 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7) basilar artery
thrombosis; in one case the pontine lesion was due to bleeding of a
brainstem cavernousmalformation (patient 3) (Fig. 2). Although arterial
hypertension had been previously diagnosed in five cases (patients 2, 3, 4,
6, and 7) and diabetes mellitus in one case (patient 7), no patient showed
additional cortical or subcortical lesions.
Quantitative analysis of MR data (Software package ImageJ 1.41; Na-
tional Institutes of Health) revealed that patients 1 and 2 had brainstem
lesions including the midbrain and the pons, patient 3 presented a lesion
spreading over the pons and the medulla oblongata, and the remaining
patients showed a selective pontine lesion. Volumetric measurements of
the lesion in each patient are enlisted in the Table 2.
Twenty right-handed subjects, matching patients for age, sex, and
education (mean age 48.6 years; SD 12.8; range, 27–65; mean edu-
cation  12.5; SD  4.9; range, 5–18), and free from neurological or
psychiatric disorders, performed the experimental tasks as normal
controls.
The study was conducted in accordance with the ethical standards of
the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki and an informed consent was obtained
from all participants.
Experimental tasks
Task 1: Recognition of facial expressions. Photographs of 10 actors (5
males, 5 females) were taken from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) set of
Table 1. Demographic and cognitive characteristics of patients
Patient no. Sex Age Cause Time from injury (months) Education (years) RCPM BFRT
1 F 33 Posttraumatic BA thrombosis 13 8 25 45
2 M 46 Spontaneous BA thrombosis 39 17 27 47
3 F 59 Brainstem hemorrhage 11 13 26 43
4 M 57 Spontaneous BA thrombosis 9 13 23 46
5 F 26 Spontaneous BA thrombosis 6 13 26 49
6 F 57 Spontaneous BA thrombosis 16 5 21 44
7 M 66 Spontaneous BA thrombosis 9 17 23 48
All scores were within normal range after adjustment for age and education according to Italian normative studies. BA, Basilar artery; RCPM, Raven’s coloured progressive matrices; BFRT, Benton facial recognition test.
Figure 1. A, B, Electromyographic recording from the orbicularis oris in subject 7, obtained
at rest (A) and during intentional contraction (B). As all patients, subject 7 showed fibrillation
potentials at rest, without appreciable recruitment ofmotor units during intended contraction.
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pictures of facial affect. Each model posed fa-
cial expressions corresponding to six basic
emotions, i.e., happiness, sadness, anger, fear,
disgust, and surprise; the complete image set
included 60 stimuli (10 items 6 emotions).
For each stimulus, subjects were required to
choose the expressed emotion among six labels
(i.e., happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust
and surprise), and then to rate emotion inten-
sity on 1–9 Likert scale (1 none, 5moder-
ate, 9 extreme).
Task 2: Judgment of emotionally evocative
scenes. Stimuli consisted of complex pictures
selected from the International Affective Pic-
ture System (IAPS) (Lang et al., 1997). Stimu-
lus selection was based on results of a pilot
study in which 80 university students assigned
200 IAPS scenes to one of six basic emotion
labels (i.e., happiness, sadness, anger, fear, dis-
gust, and surprise). In the present study, we
only used images classified by at least 70% of
normal subjects consistently; on this basis, we
had to exclude stimuli intended to elicit sur-
prise because no item of this category reached
the defined consistency level. The resulting im-
age set included 30 stimuli (6 items  5 emo-
tions); happiness was represented by scenes
involving babies or sporting events, sadness by
cemeteries or funeral scenes, anger by guns or
human violence scenes, fear by snakes or spi-
ders, and disgust by rubbish or rats. Each stim-
ulus was presented twice for a total of 60 items.
Subjects were required to evaluate each
stimulus for kind of subjectively evoked emo-
tion by choosing one of five options (i.e., hap-
piness, sadness, anger, fear, and disgust), and
to rate how strong was their emotional experi-
ence on 1–9 Likert scale (1  not at all, 5 
moderately, 9 extremely).
Procedure. During the two experimental
tasks, participants were seated 60 cm away
from a computer screen in a quiet room. Care
was taken to make stimuli of the two tasks as
similar as possible in their subtended visual an-
gle, with their widest axis being vertically ar-
ranged (max visual angle: 12°); all stimuli
remained on view in themonitor until subjects
gave their response. For each stimulus, subjects
had to select one of the emotion labels appear-
ing on a single row at the bottom of the screen;
horizontal arrangement of emotion labels
changed across stimuli. In regards to emotion
intensity rating, participants choose the num-
ber corresponding to the perceived intensity
among nine numbers horizontally displayed
under the row of emotion labels; for the pur-
pose of data analysis only ratings on correctly
recognized emotions were taken into account.
Each task was preceded by specific verbal in-
structions and by four practice trials (not con-
sidered for data analysis).
Stimuli presentation was identical for both
patients and healthy controls, but normal sub-
jects gave their response verbally, whereas
patients used the eye communication code
(upward eye movements meaning a “yes” re-
sponse, and downward movements meaning a
“no” response) to choose among alternatives
pointed to by the examiner (all given alterna-
Figure 2. MR scans showing that subjects 1 and 2 had brainstem lesion including the midbrain and the pons, subject 3
presented a lesion involving the pons and the medulla oblongata, whereas the remaining subjects showed a lesion selectively
involving the pons.
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tives were pointed to in each trial, to ensure that patients had explored
the whole array and chosen the response they preferred). Patients’
responses were recorded by an expert examiner, specifically trained to
decode eye movements and totally unaware of purposes and predic-
tions of the experiment. For both patients and controls, the examiner
recorded responses by pressing the corresponding keys on the com-
puter keyboard.
Each patient completed the two tasks in separate sessions each lasting
50 min, whereas control participants were tested in a single session
lasting1 h; task order was counterbalanced across subjects.
Results
Task 1: Recognition of facial expressions
Percentages of correct responses are shown in Figure 3A. A two-way
mixed ANOVA, with emotion (disgust, happiness, fear, anger, sur-
prise, and sadness) as a within-subject factor and group as a
between-subject factor, revealed a significantmain effect of emotion
[F(5,125) 28.405, p 0.0001], with recognition of fear (0.57) being
worse than all other emotions (disgust  0.79; happiness  0.99;
anger 0.75; surprise 0.91; and sadness 0.72). Therewas also a
main effect of group [F(1,25) 19.608, p 0.0001] overall accuracy
being lower in patients (0.71) than in normal controls (0.087). Im-
portantly, we found a significant interaction between emotion and
group [F(5,125) 4.085, p 0.002].
Post hoc comparisons (paired t tests) performed on the main
effect of emotion showed that recognition of happiness was sig-
nificantly easier than all other emotions ( p  0.0001), followed
by surprise ( p  0.001 vs remaining emotions). No significant
differences were detected in recognition of anger, sadness, or
disgust ( p 0.05), whereas recognition of fear was significantly
worse than all other emotions ( p 0.0001).
Post hoc comparisons (unpaired t tests) on the emotion 
group interaction showed that patients were significantly less ac-
curate than normal controls in recognizing disgust (t  2.755;
p  0.011), fear (t  3.348; p  0.003), anger (t  4.041; p 
0.0001), and sadness (t  2.261; p  0.033), whereas the two
groups did not differ in recognizing happiness (t0.584; p
0.564) or surprise (t 1.562; p 0.131).
Since it has been suggested that apparently selective impair-
ments in recognition of specific emotions may be ascribed to
different levels of task difficulty (Rapcsak et al., 2000), we aimed
at verifying whether such a bias could account for LIS patients’
impairment in recognizing negative emotions. To address this
issue, we needed to refer to well established difficulty ratings for
processing facial emotions. The percentage of correct judgments
for each single stimulus reported in the original study by Ekman
and Friesen (1976) can be considered themost solid data for these
purposes. We incorporated such data as a covariate in separate
one-way ANCOVAs used to compare correct responses in LIS
patients and in normal controls for each of the six emotion types
Figure 3. A, B, Mean accuracy (SEs) of controls and patients on explicit recognition of six
facial expressions (A) and on judgments of emotionally evocative scenes (B). *Significant dif-
ferences at p 0.05.
Table 2. Quantitative analysis of MR data in single patients
Subject Brainstem substructure Lesion volume (mm3) Healthy volume (mm3) Cumulative volume (mm3) Lesion volume percentage (%)
1 Midbrain 253 5286 5539 4.57
Pons 8199 6988 15187 53.99
Medulla oblongata 0 4015 4015 —
2 Midbrain 248 9745 9993 2.48
Pons 4696 8568 13,264 35.40
Medulla oblongata 0 5081 5081 —
3 Midbrain 0 5263 5263 —
Pons 3119 14,148 17,267 18.06
Medulla oblongata 2120 6939 9059 23.4
4 Midbrain 0 4707 4707 —
Pons 2417 11,289 13,706 17.63
Medulla oblongata 0 3310 3310 —
5 Midbrain 0 6844 6844 —
Pons 2950 11,035 13,985 21.09
Medulla oblongata 0 3249 3249 —
6 Midbrain 0 6288 6288 —
Pons 3610 7952 11,562 31.22
Medulla oblongata 0 3209 3209 —
7 Midbrain 0 3964 3964 —
Pons 3500 7083 10,583 33.07
Medulla oblongata 0 4593 4593 —
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(disgust, happiness, fear, anger, surprise, and sadness). Results
showed that LIS patients were significantly less accurate than con-
trols in recognizing fear [F(1,19)10.517,p0.005], anger [F(1,19)
12.637, p 0.002], and sadness [F(1,19) 4.839, p 0.042], but not
disgust [F(1,19) 2.284, p 0.149], happiness [F(1,19) 0.987, p
0.334], or surprise [F(1,19) 1.027, p 0.325].
As regards to intensity rating (oncorrectly recognizedemotions),
we performed a two-way mixed ANOVA, with emotion (disgust,
happiness, fear, anger, surprise, and sadness) as awithin-subject fac-
tor and group as a between-subject factor. Results showed a signifi-
cant main effect of emotion [F(5,125)  6.154, p  0.0001], with
fearful faces (6.50) being rated more intense than all other emotion
expressions (happiness  6.16, disgust  5.72, anger  5.50, sur-
prise  5.94, and sadness  5.65). In contrast, the main effect of
group [F(1,25) 0.392, p 0.537] and emotion group interaction
[F(5,125) 1.081, p 0.374] were not statistically significant.
Post hoc comparisons (paired t test) performed on the main
effect of emotion showed that rating of emotional intensity was
significantly higher for fear with respect to all the other emotions
( p  0.015), followed by happiness and surprise, which were
rated significantly more intense than angry, sadness, or disgust
( p 0.040). Finally, ratings of sad and disgusted expressions did
not significantly differ between each other ( p 0.05).
Finally, to verify associations among emotion recognition
performance, demographic (age and education) and clinical
(time from injury) variables, volumetricmeasurements, and cog-
nitive functioning (performance on the Raven’s colored progres-
sive matrices and on the Benton face recognition test), we
performed Spearman’s rank correlation tests. Results did not
show significant correlations ( p  0.05) among the considered
factors.
Task 2: Judgment of emotionally evocative scenes
Percentage of correct responses are shown in Figure 3B. A two-
way mixed ANOVA, with emotion (disgust, happiness, fear, an-
ger, and sadness) as a within-subject factor and group as a
between-subject factor, did not reveal significant main effects of
emotion [F(4,100)  1.812, p  0.132] or group [F(1,25)  2.727,
p  0.111]. Analogously, the interaction between emotion and
group was not significant [F(1,25)  0.187, p  0.669]. Actually,
patients and normal controls judged the five emotionally evoca-
tive scenes with equivalent accuracy and without differences
among the five emotions.
Intensity ratings (on correct responses) were analyzed by a
two-way mixed ANOVA, with emotion (disgust, happiness, fear,
anger, and sadness) as a within-subject factor and group as a
between-subject factor. Analogously to accuracy data, results did
not show significant main effects of emotion [F(4,100)  1.183,
p 0.323] and group [F(1,25) 0.308, p 0.584]. Moreover, the
interaction between emotion and group was not significant
[F(4,100) 0.851, p 0.496].
Analysis of face versus scene tasks
To confirm that LIS patients showed a selective impairment in
recognizing negative facial emotions, we performed an overall
ANOVA in which the task was treated as a within-subject factor.
For the scope of this analysis, we had to collapse emotion types
into two categories, negative (disgust, fear, anger, and sadness)
and non-negative (happiness and surprise) (Ashwin et al., 2006),
because the number of basic emotions was not the same in the
face and scene tasks. The resulting statistical design was a three-
way mixed ANOVA with group (LIS vs control) as a between-
subject factor, and emotion valence (negative vs non-negative)
and task (faces vs scenes) as within-subject factors. This analysis
showed significant main effects of emotion valence [F(1,25) 
32.733, p 0.0001], with recognition of negative emotions being
worse (0.83) than non-negative emotions (0.91), and of group
[F(1,25)  10.968, p  0.003], with patients being less accurate
(0.76) than normal controls (0.88). In contrast, themain effect of
task was not significant [F(1,25) 0.405, p 0.530], since overall
accuracy did not differ between face (0.83) and scene (0.81) tasks.
Moreover, we found a significant first-order interaction between
emotion valence and task [F(1,25) 19.645, p 0.0001], but not
between task and group [F(1,25)  0.089, p  0.767] or between
emotion valence and group [F(1,25)  1.909, p  0.179]. More
relevant here, results showed that the second-order interaction
among emotion valence, task, and group was statistically signifi-
cant [F(1,25) 9.486, p 0.005]. Post hoc comparisons (unpaired
t tests) performed on this task emotion valence group inter-
action showed that LIS patients were significantly less accurate
than normal controls in recognizing negative (t  4.488, p 
0.0001) but not non-negative (t  1.345, p  0.191) facial
expressions, whereas LIS patients did not differ from controls
in recognizing both negative (t  1.485, p  0.150) and non-
negative (t  1.326, p  0.197) IAPS scenes (see Fig. 4).
To verify the nature of the errors made by the patients in
recognizing facial emotions we also checked whether patients
tended to misattribute facial expressions within the categories
(negative or positive, e.g., misidentifying fear as disgust or hap-
piness as surprise) or between positive and negative categories
(e.g., misidentifying fear as surprise). The percentage of total
within-category errors (70 of 114; 61%) for negative facial emo-
tions was higher than that of between-category errors (39%),
whereas the percentage of within- and between-category errors
was similar in healthy controls (51% vs 49%). However, the dis-
tribution of these errors in patients and controls did not differ
significantly (two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, p 0.11). The distri-
bution of within- and between-category errors for positive emo-
tions virtually overlapped in patients and controls.
Discussion
In the present study, LIS patients were significantly less accurate
than normal controls in recognizing negative emotional facial
expressions and tended to confound negative emotions with each
other; the dissociation between recognition of negative versus
non-negative emotions was not found with IAPS scenes. Some
authors have suggested that a selective defect in recognition of
specific emotional faces could reflect differential difficulty levels
Figure 4. Mean scores (SEs) of controls and patients on recognition of facial expressions and
IAPS scenes for the negative and non-negative valence emotions. *Significant differences at
p 0.05.
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across emotions (Rapcsak et al., 2000). However, an analysis tak-
ing into account the stimuli’s difficulty, as reported by Ekman
andFriesen (1976), confirmed that patientswere significantly less
accurate than controls in recognizing negative expressions (with
the exception of disgust). Moreover, differences in task difficulty
between face and scene tasks could not explain our findings as the
three-way ANOVA did not reveal a significant effect of task, but
confirmed a significant interaction among task, group, and type
of emotion. Therefore, the impaired explicit recognition of neg-
ative facial expressions in LIS patients appears to be a solid find-
ing that can elucidate the role of sensorimotor activation in
emotion attribution.
Simulative theories posit that reenactment of sensory andmo-
tor components related to emotional experience contribute to
attribution of emotions to others (Niedenthal, 2007). A funda-
mental assumption of simulative models also foresees a co-
occurrence of deficits in production and recognition of the very
same emotion (i.e., paired deficits) in brain-damaged patients
(Goldman and Sripada, 2005;Niedenthal, 2007).However, this is
not a systematic finding, thus suggesting that simulation alone is
not sufficient to explain emotion attribution (Keysers and Gazzola,
2006). Actually, it has been claimed that emotion attribution cannot
be restricted to simulation and would imply supplementary explicit
cognitive computations (Keysers and Gazzola, 2006). These cogni-
tive processes are well represented by the concept of theory of mind
(ormentalizing), describing a set of cognitive abilities allowing sub-
jects to think about the mind (e.g., beliefs, desires, emotions) of
others (Frith and Frith, 1999).
The present demonstration that impaired voluntary mimicry
affects conscious recognition of facial expressions, without ham-
pering adequate emotional responses to complex scenes, does not
fit with the assumption of paired deficits predicted by “pure”
simulative theories (Goldman and Sripada, 2005). Instead, it is
consistent with hybrid theories according to which simulation
and mentalizing contribute to different aspects of mind-reading
(Keysers and Gazzola, 2006; Goldman, 2009). In such theoretical
frames, implicit sharing and understanding of others’ states (low-
levelmind-reading) is guaranteed by simulation, likely subserved
by the mirror neuron system (Gallese, 2003), whereas conscious
and explicit reflections on these contents would require high-level
mind-reading processes (Keysers and Gazzola, 2006; Goldman,
2009).Our findingsprovideadirect support to the existenceofhigh-
level simulation mechanisms playing a crucial role in explicit attri-
bution of emotions.
The problem remains of defining whether central or periph-
eral motor mechanisms are implied in emotion attribution
(Calder et al., 2000; Keillor et al., 2002). A lesion of the ventral
pons, as in LIS patients, interrupts efferent pathways but also
interferes with functional connections linking frontal, pari-
etal, and limbic cortex with cerebellum via pontine nuclei.
Actually, a cerebellar dysfunction has been demonstrated in
chronic LIS patients (Laureys et al., 2005) and can delineate a
complex syndrome characterized by cognitive and affective dis-
orders (Schmahmann and Sherman, 1998). The functional inter-
ruption of parieto-cerebellar connections might abolish forward
mechanisms predicting consequences ofmovements (Blakemore
and Decety, 2001; Blakemore and Sirigu, 2003), a defect contrib-
uting to severe motor imagery defects in LIS patient (Conson et
al., 2008). Analogously, the functional impairment of corticocer-
ebellar circuits could account for the selective impairment in
explicit recognition of emotional facial expressions, a process
that mainly requires activation of frontal structures (Lewis et al.,
2007; Yamada et al., 2009). Therefore, an impairment of these
central neural mechanisms would interfere with high-level sim-
ulative processes involved in emotion attribution. This hypothe-
sis would also account for the lack of emotion recognition defects
in patients with either congenital (Mobius syndrome) (Calder et
al., 2000) or acquired (due to Guillain-Barre syndrome) (Keillor
et al., 2002) bilateral peripheral facial palsy. In this perspective,
not mimicry per se but its central mechanisms would play a crit-
ical role in conscious emotion attribution. Instead, rating inten-
sity of emotions has been ascribed to activation of amygdala
(Adolphs et al., 1994, 1999; Lewis et al., 2007), and this could
explain the normal performance of LIS patients on this task. Ac-
tually, no metabolic sign of reduced function has been demon-
strated in amygdala of chronic LIS patients (Laureys et al., 2005).
The dissociation between impaired recognition of emotional
valence and spared intensity rating of facial expressions fits with
available functional neuroimaging data in LIS patients (Laureys
et al., 2005), whereas the possiblemechanisms accounting for the
selective defect in recognition of negative versus non-negative
facial expressions remain uncertain. Among visual stimuli with
emotional valence, facial expressions hold a relevant role with
respect to social interaction and survival (Blair, 2003; Schutter et
al., 2008). Actually, processing emotional faces prompts a series
of physiological modifications related to action preparedness
(Dalgleish, 2004; Schutter et al., 2008) that varies as a function of
the valence of the expressed emotion. Although a general re-
lationship exists between emotional processing and the motor
system (Oliveri et al., 2003), Schutter et al. (2008) showed that
transcranial magnetic stimulation applied over the left pri-
mary motor cortex during the presentation of emotional facial
expressions selectively increased motor-evoked potentials to
fearful but not to happy or neutral expressions. This selective
motor activation to fearful faces seems to reflect action prepared-
ness to threat (Schutter et al., 2008), which is mediated by the
activity of frontal cortical structures specifically involved in
processing negative emotional signals (van Honk et al., 2002;
Anders et al., 2009). Within this framework, we could specu-
late that in LIS patients the functional disconnection of the
corticocerebellar circuits could more specifically impair rec-
ognition of negative facial expressions, thus preventing sub-
jects from consciously detecting threats in the environment.
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